Abstract. In an optical transport network distinct logical groups of lightwave channels between neighboring OXC nodes (called spans) may sometimes be realized over a common physical resource such as a duct or conduit, and hence share a common cause of failure. This is closely related to the concept of shared risk on individual channels or links, called SRLGs, which is relevant to pre-planned path protection schemes with shared capacity on backup paths. But when considering span-restorable networks, shared risk over logical spans (not individual channels) is the corresponding issue of concern. This work considers several aspect of how such shared-risk span groups (SRSG) affect the protection capacity design and other aspects of span-restorable mesh networks. We provide a model for capacity planning any span-restorable network in the presence of a known set of such shared-risk spans and study the relationship between capacity requirements and the number and placement of such situations. This provides guidelines as to how many SRSGs can be sustained before the capacity penalty becomes severe and methods to diagnose which of them are the most limiting to overall protection efficiency. One finding of interest is that if a given percentage of all possible dual-failure combinations incident to a common node are allowed for in the design, then nearly the same percentage of other dual-span failure combinations (any two spans in the network) will also be restorable. We also show that designing a network to withstand even a small number of multi-span co-incident spared-risk span groups will yield a significant improvement in overall dual-failure restorability and hence also in network availability.
Introduction
Today interruptions in communication services can result in serious financial and other consequences. Despite considerable efforts at physical protection of cables, FCC statistics show that metro networks annually experience 13 cuts for every 1000 miles of fiber, and long haul networks experience three cuts for 1000 miles fiber [1] . Even the lower rate for long haul networks implies a cable cut every 4 days on average in a not untypical network with 30,000 route-miles of fiber. Notably the Gartner Group even predicts that ''Through 2004, large U.S. enterprises will have lost more than $500 million in potential revenue due to network failures that affect critical business functions'' [2] . Accordingly, network restoration (or protection) has become an integral part of the design of optical transport networks. Recent years have seen great progress in techniques for designing survivable networks, most often with the intent of handling any one single span failure at a time.
In an optical network a span is the set of all singlehop lightwave channels between adjacent optical cross-connect (OXC) nodes. Ideally, any single physical structure failure affects only channels common to one logical span of the network. In practice, however, there are cases where logically distinct spans between cross-connects may share the same physical duct for a portion of their length, for example on a bridge-crossing close to a common OXC node. The physical commonality may be only a few hundred meters, but if damage occurs to the common structure, it is of special significance from a survivability standpoint because in the logical layer at which restoration occurs the problem appears as if it were simultaneous failures on two separate spans.
Situations where two logically distinct spans share common-mode failure structures can be called shared-risk span groups (SRSGs), which recognizes the related and more general concept of shared-risk link groups (SRLGs) [3] . However, under the SRLG concept every cable sheath represents an SRLG (grouping all the lightpaths that traverse it). This kind of SRLG is primarily relevant to shared-backup path protection schemes where common risks arising from every cable along the distinct working paths must be known. In the context of span restoration, however, each cable or duct between neighboring OXCs has always been (in the current language) the default SRLG. In other words all channels are assumed to fail together in a span, and span restoration views them as a single total amount of capacity to be restored. So the treatment of every cable as an SRLG is not really a helpful refinement to spanrestorable (SR) network design, it just renames what has always been the default failure model. Nonetheless the general notion of fault multiplication does apply to SR networks as well, but it is of concern only at the level of whole spans sharing a common risk, hence what we call a shared-risk span group. To avoid proliferating terminology, however, we refer to this specialized subset of all possible SRLGs as span SRLGs instead. Thus a span SRLG is a specific type of SRLG situation where two or more logical spans share a common physical risk. By the nature of span restoration, it is only span SRLGs that require any special attention. The default SRLG failure scenario is the norm in a span-restorable design and is fully captured in the concept of a span and span failure itself. Span SRLGs will, however, require special design attention to retain survivability and even more specialized considerations if their very presence may be unknown to the network operator.
While span SRLGs may be theoretically of any multiplicity, our interest is to consider how various numbers and locations of dual-span SRLGs affect the capacity requirements of span-restorable mesh networks (a dual-span SRLG is one where only two spans are members of the SRLG). An aim is to see if guidelines or insights might be possible to understand which span SRLGs are the most deleterious to efficiency of an SR network design. This would contribute to identification of span SRLGs that may be worth eliminating through physical re-routing efforts. The idea is first to understand how span SRLGs affect spare capacity requirements for restoration and then to seek ways to help pinpoint those cases where it would be most worthwhile to actively eliminate specific span SRLGs. In addition we want to understand how a network designed to accommodate an arbitrary number of dual-span SRLGs compares to a network that is explicitly designed for dual-failure restorability. This includes understanding how much coverage against possibly unknown span SRLGs one might obtain for any given level of total capacity investment above the basis allocation for single-failure restorability.
Why Span Restoration?
Our scope is limited to understanding how span SRLGs affect span-restorable networks. In pathbased survivability mechanisms, paths affected by span failures are restored by alternate routes between their end nodes. Methods for this include shared backup path protection (SBPP) [4, 5] , dedicated 1 + 1 APS [6] , and dynamic path restoration [7] . Path-oriented schemes (except for 1 + 1) tend to be slightly more efficient in terms of spare capacity requirements [7] [8] [9] than span restoration schemes. But this comes at a price in design complexity and often speed as well due to the greater geographical extent of the recovery process. Dynamic adaptive (i.e., failure-dependent) path restoration with stub release is the most capacityefficient of all schemes but is often thought to be difficult to implement due to stub release and reversion issues. The SBPP scheme is simpler because it excludes the stub release option. Under current proposals, however, it requires a global OSPF-TE type of topology and resource database in every node including a database of current network-wide backup link sharing arrangements, making this scheme intensively dependent on Internet-type dissemination of global state and database synchronization issues. In addition the path provisioning process under SBPP is tasked with explicitly arranging the shared capacity protection path at service setup. Some see this as a desirable feature (for customers to control their own protection arrangements). But an alternative provisioning paradigm is one in which protection is inherent, if the capacity is present to route the new path at all. This simpler and more scalable property is obtained with a span-protected working capacity environment. There is no requirement to explicitly arrange a shared disjoint backup path for every individual provisioning operation, or to update the network-wide state for each new protection path setup or takedown. The capacity used for dynamic provisioning is itself protected, so any service provisioned over available working capacity is inherently also protected with no further requirements.
The latter provisioning paradigm is inherent in a network employing a span restoration mechanism and corresponding capacity design method. Provisioning a new path is solely a matter of routing the working path (and designating its protection status). There is no explicit concern about making protection arrangements because the envelope of working capacity on each span over which the path was provisioned is itself protected as an automatic function of the transport network. The working capacities on spans are directly protected, not the whole paths per se. A service path is automatically survivable against all single span failures (and many dual failures [10, 11] ) when provisioned because each channel on the path is allocated from a pool of protected capacity on each span. The difference is thus between provisioning protection (as in SBPP) or provisioning over protected capacity (as in SR). A distributed adaptive restoration algorithm (DRA) can be used directly in real time, or, used to conduct the prefailure dress rehearsals that prepare a network to act in a pre-planned link-protected mode. Under distributed pre-planning (DPP) [12] , the protection is continually pre-planned and thus the evolving demand pattern is autonomously tracked. As Medard [13] points out, such span-protected networks have the desirable properties of very high speed and since [protection arrangements are] not dependent upon specific traffic patterns, can be preplanned once and for all. We would only refine Medard's statement to add that under the concept of DPP the network itself can autonomously update its pre-planning for very fast link protection, tracking the evolution of the actual demand pattern between failures.
Another reason for considering span restoration (or link protection) is that it offers different options for handling SRLG issues, which is the focus of this paper. SBPP deals with SRLGs by ensuring the failure-disjointness of all paths that share the same spare channels in their backup paths. In general this involves a large amount of network state data and it needs to be disseminated and maintained in every node and re-considered on every new path provisioning exercise. In contrast a link-protected scheme can be designed once in a way in which all lightpaths crossing any span are automatically protected, including SRLG effects. The effect of span SRLGs is taken into account in a single design process for the whole network leaving an envelope of working capacity for which protection is assured in advance. This envelope of protected working capacity on each span is then used to support dynamic demand arrivals and departures simply by routing each new path through the protected working capacity envelope [18] . Thus, SRLG issues are considered only once during capacity planning, not in real time for every path provisioned.
To the extent that dual-span SRLGs may require extra spare capacity, it is also apparent that a pre-planned link-protected response to initial failures, followed up by an adaptive restoration response to a second failure, should it arise, will give an inherently higher level of availability to paths than SBPP can. This is because the adaptive span restoration response often withstands dual failures fully or to relatively high levels [11] . This dual-failure recovery ability automatically benefits service path availability, and can even be assigned on a priority basis, whereas under SBPP the only recourse under a dual failure that affects the path of interest and its backup is to initiate a complete end-to-end re-provisioning process for the affected path. This will, however, be a slow process, with an uncertain outcome, as the network is by definition at this time undergoing (possibly voluminous) LSA flooding and OSPF-TE database re-synchronization and the mass redial of all affected services has no global coordination to ensure efficient resolution of multi-commodity capacity contention.
Outline
The next section develops the considerations for design of a span-restorable network for a specific set of known dual-span SRLGs. This includes developing the relationship between dual-span SRLGs and dual-failure scenarios in general. In Section 3 we describe the experimental methods through which span SRLG effects on capacity design are quantitatively studied using the theoretical model of Section 2. Section 4, as well as Sections 5-7 are devoted to presentation and discussion of different aspects of the experimental results. We conclude in Section 8. In most prior work on span-restorable mesh networks, the set of all single span failures is taken as the set of failure scenarios for the capacity design problem. There is, however, no inherent limitation of span-restorable networks to handling only single span failures. Usually the set of single span failures is simply the most convenient and repeatable paradigm for comparative studies or research, and data is not available about which specific higher-order failure combinations should be considered. It is known, however, that designing for all dual-failure combinations in a span-restorable network will greatly increase the spare capacity requirement [10, 11] . So designing to handle all possible dual failures in general is probably not a practical approach to handling dual-span SRLGs.
A historical difficulty in including span SRLG effects in studies of SR networks is that it is hard to get data on specific SRLG assumptions to be employed. Perhaps understandably (because this might be considered sensitive data or is hard for the network operator to even determine) it has been difficult to obtain network models complete with data on span SRLGs. In what follows we will therefore postulate certain numbers and placements of SRLGs, particularly dual-span SRLGs incident on a common node, to study their effects on capacity requirements to retain 100% restorability against any one outside-plant structure failure. Dual logical span failures incident on a common node are understood to be the most common in practice, and we will refer to them as co-incident span SRLGs. Fig. 1 illustrates the three co-incident span SRLG combinations possible at a degree-3 node. An SRLG involving two spans that are not incident on a common node will be referred to as a non-co-incident span SRLG. A span SRLG whose type is not specified is simply called a general span SRLG, and a group of SRLGs containing both types will also be a group of general SRLGs. It is important to understand that dual failures in general are a far broader class of failure scenario than co-incident SRLGs. A dual failure may involve any two spans that are in a failed state overlapping in time, although they may have failed independently. Co-incident SRLGs always involve two spans with a common node and are assumed to arise from a single common cause of failure. We must also recognize nodal bypass arrangements, often referred to as express routes or glassthroughs, as the source of another type of logical dual-failure situation, and distinguish these from co-incident SRLGs. Fig. 2(a) shows an example of a nodal bypass arrangement in which one or more wavelength channels, over typically one or more express fibers, bypass the OXC at node B but follow the same ducts as other channels on spans A-B and B-C. Such bypass arrangements are usually established when the demand (in the example, between nodes A and C) warrants its own dedicated fiber(s) but a separate geographical route is not available. In this case the A-C express fibers can be well enough loaded that they can be dedicated to the A-C direct logical span, saving OEO termination costs at the intermediate node B. This obviously sets up certain logical dual-failure situations. For instance if duct A-B is cut, spans A-B and A-C appear to fail simultaneously. The effect of the logical dual-failure scenarios that such bypass designs present have, however, been studied already in [14] where it has been shown both experimentally and theoretically that bypass arrangements themselves never cause an increase in the spare capacity requirements of a spanrestorable mesh network. In fact in general, depending on conditions related to forcer analysis [14] , some bypasses result in a reduction in the total spare capacity needed for 100% restorability. Although this seems counter-intuitive at first, [14] explains that each bypass creates a specific form of dispersal of the end nodes involved in logical span restoration, resulting in more efficient spare capacity use. This is ultimately the same reason for the reduction of spare capacity obtained with the special forms of chain sub-network bypass considered in the meta-mesh design concept of [9] . But it bears explaining how a dual-span SRLG and a nodal bypass differ because at first glance they can seem to be almost identical arrangements that cause one physical failure to escalate into two logical failures.
To do this Fig. 2 (b) shows a co-incident SRLG situation. The main difference between the dual logical failures arising from a bypass and from a co-incident SRLG is that the latter involves two nodes that are directly connected to node A, whereas in a bypass, the end nodes of one of the logical failures is not a neighbor of the common node. By definition, to form the bypass, there is always a closed set of logical spans that directly link the ''triangle'' of nodes A, B, C. This means that if duct A-B fails, span B-C is always in existence in the restored state, effectively shunting nodes B and C together as sinks for restoration flow from node A. In addition (and most importantly) the optimal capacity design for Fig. 2 (a) would already have included provision for span failures (A-B) and (B-C) in the absence of a direct physical span from A to C. In contrast, the dualspan SRLG failure brings down two physical spans of the network, not just one physical span and an associated logical bypass span. The dual-span SRLG failure can also disperse the damage to nodes that are arbitrarily distant from each other routing-wise (but common to node A) requiring more capacity to support restoration flow. The difference is subtle but important in terms of the effect on capacity design. Under optimal design [14] , bypass failures are always restorable with the same or less spare capacity than the corresponding fully terminated (non-bypass) case. But the coincident span SRLG case can only ever require more spare capacity for restoration than the corresponding case without the SRLG.
Basic Span-Restorable Spare Capacity Design Model
We now present the basic capacity design of spanrestorable mesh networks, which we use as the starting point for the dual-span SRLG design problem and as the benchmark designs for later comparisons. We begin with a recap of the basic single-failure design method where no SRLGs are considered, then extend the model to include any arbitrary set of dual-span SRLG failure scenarios.
We base the design of span-restorable mesh networks on the Integer Linear Programming (ILP) formulation introduced for spare capacity assignment (SCA) in [15] . Working capacity is first placed as required to support shortest path routing of all demands and we generate a set of routes that are eligible for use in restoration of each span's working capacity. By eligible restoration routes we are referring back to the nature of the arc-path approach in [15] where the basic spare capacity design problem is defined as an assignment of restoration flows to distinct routes under an allowed length or hop limit. By enumerating only eligible restoration routes for the problem formulation, it ensures that restoration in the resulting design can be under engineering control for length, loss, jurisdiction, or any other eligibility criteria. The basic SCA design problem is as follows: 
Subject to
The objective function (1) minimizes the total cost of spare capacity placed on all spans in the network. Constraints in (2) ensure that for failure of span i, we have enough restoration flow between the end-nodes of the span failure to fully restore all the working capacity on the failed span. Constraint set (3) forces sufficient spare capacity on each span j such that the sum of the restoration paths routed over that span is met for failure of any span i. The largest simultaneously imposed set of restoration paths effectively sets the s j value on each span in the solution. Pre-processing steps to enumerate the sets of eligible restoration routes are discussed in Section 3. A variation on the SCA model for span-restorable network design is joint capacity assignment (JCA), where working routes and capacity are jointly designed optimally with restoration routing and spare capacity [8, 9] . This study is, however, based solely on non-joint models for capacity planning in which all demands are first shortest-path routed before solving optimally for the spare capacity assignment.
Adding Dual-Span SRLG Considerations to the Design Model
To provide the added spare capacity that restoration of dual-span SRLG failure scenarios may take, the SCA framework is extended to become SRLG-SCA. The objective function and constraints of SCA all are repeated. The following additional parameter and variable, and constraint systems are added: Restoration flow assigned to pth eligible restoration route for span i if span h has cofailed (non-negative integer variable)
Constraint set (4) ensures there is enough restoration flow to restore span i if span h has co-failed and vice-versa: enough restoration flow exists to restore span h if span i has co-failed. In constraint set (5), restoration flow for either span in a dual-span SRLG is restricted from crossing the other span. Finally, constraint set (6) guarantees that enough spare capacity is allocated on each span j in the network to fully accommodate all SRLG-related restoration routes crossing it. Note that these constraints are in addition to those in (2) and (3) which continue to account for any single span failure.
This approach allows specific SRLGs to be specified and included in the restorable capacity design by setting the C h;i input parameters. Although for compactness of presentation here we can consider this to be an |S|Â(|S| )1) space, the ILP solver will implicitly consider only the stipulated cases where C h;i = 1, potentially reducing the actual set to be considered a great deal.
Experimental Test Methods
Three test networks were used in this study, a 25-node 50-span network (25n50s1), a 35-node 70-span network (35n70s1), and a 40-node 70-span network (40n70s1). For each network, the length of each span is the Euclidean distance on the plane between the end nodes that the span connects as drawn in Fig. 3 . For fairly obvious reasons, all nodes in the test-case networks are of degree-3 or higher as it is infeasible to consider a co-incident SRLG on the two spans of a degree-2 node; such dual failures are fundamentally un-restorable by any restoration or protection scheme. Capacity costs are taken as proportional to the length of the span and the number of wavelength channels (of both working or spare) required on the span. In each test network, every origin-destination (O-D) node pair exchanges a number of lightpath demands that is drawn from a uniform random distribution on 1...10. All lightpath demands were first routed along their shortest paths (by total span-distance, not span-count). The ILP formulation was implemented in AMPL and solved with Parallel CPLEX 7.1 MIP Solver on a 4-processor Ultrasparc Sun Server. None of the SRLG-SCA designs took more than a minute to solve and most solved in a few seconds. Results were based on full CPLEX terminations using a MIPGAP of 10 )4 , meaning all solutions are guaranteed to be within 0.01% of optimal.
All working and spare capacity allocations were integer, corresponding to capacity design and restoration mechanisms operating at the wavelength-channel level. Although strictly speaking, restoration flows are also integer in the model, as is commonly done, we relaxed all restoration flows in solving these problems. Under integer capacity this is without loss of optimality for this problem [16] . For comparative studies we avoid any specific modularity assumptions that could obscure the study of basic network architectural effects that is intended. Capacity modularity with economy of scale in cost versus capacity can, however, be fairly easily added to the SRLG-SCA model if desired, using the approach in [17] . In general modularity effects would be expected to ease any spare capacity penalties observed here due to span SRLG effects.
A pre-processing program generates the sets of eligible restoration routes for each failure scenario. Ideally one would represent all possible distinct routes between the end-nodes of each span failure (excluding the failed span), up to some threshold hop limit, H. A somewhat more practical strategy that we use is, however, to set a target number of eligible restoration routes for every failure scenario and then enumerate all distinct routes at increasing hop limits until the target number is met or exceeded. All results are based on this procedure to represent at least 10 distinct routes for every span restoration scenario. Prior tests with this approach suggest that any remaining gap to absolute optimality due to limitation of the route-sets is $1% or less. Certainly the comparative conclusions of the study are not affected by any remaining gap against absolute optimality. To characterize how the capacity costs rise if we are to make multiple co-incident span SRLGs and general SRLGs (or even any dual failure scenario in general) restorable, we first do a study where we vary the number of co-incident SRLGs in the test network. Using a simple program for the purpose, each possible pairing of spans incident on the same node is generated for all nodes and a pre-determined percentage of all such possible co-incident span SRLGs are chosen at random to exist in each test case. The percentage of co-incident SRLGs present was varied from 0 to 100% in increments of 10%, with 10 individual random test cases at each percentage, for each test case network. Using the SRLG-SCA formulation in Section 2, the spare capacity costs (for 100% restorability) were determined for each test case design individually and averaged over the ten test cases at each specific percentage of co-incident span SRLGs existent in each network. Costs are expressed as a percentage increase relative to the cost of spare capacity required for single span failures only (the solution for SCA). For comparative purposes the process was repeated on the more general set of all possible dual-failure scenarios as well.
Figs 4-6 show how the relative cost of spare capacity required increases as more of all the possible dual-span co-incident SRLGs are included for each test network (i.e., as the percentage of possible SRLGs in existence, as described above, increases), one figure per network. In each figure, the curve with square markers shows the average cost of spare capacity required to make the indicated percentage of co-incident span SRLGs restorable, relative to the cost of spare capacity required to simply make all single span failures (the case with no span SRLGs) restorable. The light curve with round markers shows the average cost of spare capacity required to make the indicated percentage (as defined above) of all possible dual failures restorable relative to the cost of spare capacity required to simply make all single span failures only restorable. The dotted curves show the maximum and minimum cost extremes over the set of 10 trials of randomly placed co-incident SRLG test cases only.
First we see that if half of all possible co-incident SRLGs were present, roughly twice as much (100% more) spare capacity would often be needed. Anecdotally we are lead to believe that these curves would more likely be read at the 10% or lower level, however, where depending on exact dispositions of the fewer span SRLGs there might still be a 25-50% spare capacity penalty. Eventually when all possible co-incident SRLGs exist in a network, the spare capacity requirements are 153-213% greater than for single failure only designs. 
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The curves comparing the cost of spare capacity as we increase the number of dual failures in general behave in a similar manner, although the spare capacity requirements are slightly greater. A more general finding of interest is that if we allow for the specified percentage of any dual failure, we see that the cost of spare capacity provisioning will only be slightly greater than if we have the same percentage of all possible co-incident SRLGs present. This is somewhat unexpected because there are many more dual-failure possibilities in general than co-incident span SRLG combinations. Consider, for instance, that network 40n70s1 consists of 21 nodes of degree-3 accounting for 63 co-incident SRLGs (3 choose 2 times 21), 18 nodes of degree-4 accounting for another 108 co-incident SRLGs, and one node of degree-5 accounting for another 10 co-incident SRLGs, for a total of 181 possible co-incident SRLGs. If the network has 50% of all possible co-incident SRLGs existent, then we are providing spare capacity for approximately 90 span SRLGs in addition to that required for single span failures. But the number of all possible dual failures in general is 70 choose 2 = 2415. 50% of these are approximately 1207, more than an order of magnitude greater than the number of co-incident SRLGs. But the spare capacity to cover 50% of all possible dual-span failures is only $4% (and under 10% in the others) more than for covering 50% of the many fewer span SRLG possibilities. Co-incident SRLGs are thus much more strategic to consider for restorability design and much more dominant on the capacity design than are the vast majority of other ordinary dual-failure scenarios. This is completely consistent with prior observations that span restoration tends to be limited by spare capacity bottlenecks at one or the other end node of the span being restored, because co-incident SRLGs directly reduce this critical end node's surviving spare capacity total and the diversity of restoration routing options for entry or egress from the failure end nodes.
Assessing Dual Failure Restorability of Co-Incident SRLG Coverage
All of the cases discussed in Section 4 were by design, 100% restorable, whether for dual-span failures in general or co-incident SRLG cases. Let us now consider designing only for co-incident span SRLG cases but then analyzing the resultant partial restorability level arising for all possible dual failures. Using the SRLG-SCA design model, none of the specified dual-span SRLGs will cause a loss of restorability. The point of view in this section is to see how much overall dual-failure restorability designing for dual-span SRLGs buys us as a side effect.
To motivate this, previous work [10] has already related the dual-failure restorability of an SR network to the availability of service paths. It follows that making the network restorable to [10] . To quantify the reaction to a specific dual failure of span a and span b, the dual-failure restorability of the affected service paths R 
The actual probability of any given dual-span failure combination depends on span length, mean time between fiber cuts, mean time to repair fiber, etc. These are data that can change with every network context, however, and are best embodied in specific planning tools or assigned by network planners in their own businesses. But what is fundamental to the basic choice of logical architecture are the intrinsic R 2 (a, b) values. So for more lasting generality and insight it is actually the measure of R 2 (a,b) that we characterize here. It can always be related to service availability through Equation (8) . Moreover, R 2 (a,b) itself has the direct practical interpretation of answering the question: on the average (or on a specific) dualfailure combination, what fraction of affected demands will experience a service disruption? In effect all that Equation (8) adds are the implications due to consideration of the expected duration effects of the outage. But the number magnitude of the dual-failure impact is measured directly by R 2 (a,b). For more on the relationship between availability, unavailability, and R 2 (a,b), and to see how Equation (8) is derived, see [11] .
The relevance to our current work is that using the above expressions, and computational methods in [11] , we calculated the network average R It is also of interest to inspect how designing for full-restorability of some co-incident SRLGs might result in many other dual failures being automatically made fully restorable as a consequence of the extra capacity placed. The lower curve (with triangular markers, using right axis) in each of Figs 7-9 shows that provisioning spare capacity for a given percentage of co-incident SRLGs will be sufficient such that a much higher percentage of dual failures are also fully restorable without adding any new capacity. In fact, most dual failures in general (from 70 to 80%, depending on the test network) already start out as fully restorable simply as a side effect of placing spare capacity for single-span restorability. If we explicitly design for some co-incident SRLGs, however, we can further increase the other non-coincident SRLGs or dual failures that are fully restorable. For instance, making 10% of all coincident SRLGs restorable will increase the percentage of dual failures that are also restorable from 76 to 84% for the 25n50s1 network, from 80 to 87% for 35n70s1, and from 70 to 84% for 40n70s1. This evidence all further supports the view that co-incident SRLGs are more costly and difficult to accommodate than arbitrary dual failure or non-co-incident SRLGs in general.
Effects of Co-Incident Span SRLG Location
In this section we try to gain insights about when an individual co-incident SRLG will have serious or benign effects on capacity design in terms of where it is located in the network. For instance, it seems reasonable to expect a greater spare capacity cost arising from a co-incident span SRLG at a degree-3 node than at a degree-4 node. But this might also depend on location of the node in the network, or the pattern of demand flow, etc. To seek insights of this type we randomly generated 240 SRLG test cases in the 40n70s1 network. 30 of the test cases contained one co-incident SRLG at a degree-3 node, 30 contained co-incident SRLGs at two different degree-3 nodes, 30 contained co-incident SRLGs at three degree-3 nodes, and a final 30 contained co-incident SRLGs at four different degree-3 nodes. A matching set of 120 test cases was similarly divided amongst co-incident SRLGs incident at degree-4 nodes. indicated number of co-incident SRLGs. Test cases involving SRLGs at degree-3 nodes are shown as round markers and those at degree-4 nodes are triangular markers. The average spare capacity design cost over test cases with the same number of co-incident SRLGs at each nodal degree are shown with the slightly larger markers joined by a line. It's clear that on average, SRLGs incident on degree-3 nodes are indeed more costly than those incident on degree-4 nodes. This is an expected result since co-incident SRLGs incident on a node of low degree will have fewer options available in terms of which surviving spans can be used for restoration. Co-incident SRLGs incident on richly connected nodes are able to distribute their restoration routes (and hence spare capacity) to a greater degree. It is also of interest to compare costs of co-incident SRLGs incident on nodes that are notionally in the core of the network versus those at or near the network perimeter. To do this, the same 240 test cases defined above are given a classification based on inspection of their geographical location in the test network graph. Twenty test cases contain a single co-incident SRLG located at the edge, 20 near the edge, and another 20 in the core, and similarly for test cases containing two, three, and four co-incident SRLGs. Examples of the three location classes (edge, near-edge, and interior/core) are shown in Fig. 11 .
Each data point in Fig. 12 corresponds to the spare capacity cost increase relative to the singlefailure model for each test case as indicated, with the averages of each type connected by lines. Initial expectations were that co-incident SRLGs in the interior of the network graph would be less costly than those near the edge because they would have a greater number of restoration routing options available to them. This is clearly not the case, however. Upon investigation, the explanation seems to be that this is a result of the greater amount of working capacity on spans at the core. Since demands are shortest path routed, there are many more O-D pair combinations whose shortest path travels through the interior of the network than through the perimeter. Consequently, a co-incident SRLG in the interior will generally require a higher amount of restoration flow and spare capacity than one near the edge of the network graph. While these findings will be dependent upon the network's connectivity and the wavelength demand set used, we suspect that typical networks are likely to exhibit similar behavior; we will observe a greater amount of paths routed through the network core than around the edge.
Identifying The Most Troublesome SRLGs
We now return to one of our original motivations. That is the question of trying to identify not only which types of SRLG have the worst impact on network efficiency and expense, but also which specific SRLGs in a network might a network planner consider for removal? We can further ask what the removal of the few most troublesome SRLGs will do to relieve the composite capacity penalty they present as a set.
Using the design method in Section 2 (SRLG-SCA), we optimally provisioned the 40n70s1 network for full restorability with a random dis- tribution of 18 co-incident SRLGs (Test Case 1), and compared its design cost to that of a benchmark test case network with no SRLGs present (Test Case 0). For this test network 18 SRLGs account for 10% of all the possible co-incident SRLGs. Additionally, we provisioned 18 separate test case network designs, each with only one of the 18 SRLGs from Test Case 1 present (we call these Test Cases A through R). Their individual spare capacity costs were compared to the benchmark, and ranked from worst to best (the worst SRLG is the one that requires the most additional spare capacity relative to the benchmark test case). Finally, the worst SRLG was removed from Test Case 1, creating a new test case, then the next worst was removed, and so on until we had removed the four worst or ''most troublesome'' SRLGs, as measured by their capacity impact when evaluated alone as the only SRLG in the network.
In Table 1 , test case networks are identified by ''Test Case'', the ''# SRLGs'' column indicates the number of SRLGs present in that test case and ''Normalized Cost'' records how much extra spare capacity we must add to the network as compared to the no-SRLG benchmark (Test Case 0). ''Rank'' shows where each of the single-SRLG test cases ranks according to Normalized Cost (from highest to lowest), and ''SRLGs Removed'' identifies the SRLGs that were removed from Test Case 1 to create the current test case. Finally, ''Cost Improvement'' shows by how much we have reduced the normalized cost of Test Case 1 by removing the specified SRLGs.
In further support of findings in Section 6, we found that the five most costly co-incident SRLGs are again all incident on nodes near the core of the network. As can be seen in Table 1 , individual SRLGs can vary quite significantly in their impact on spare capacity requirements, in fact, two SRLGs (Test Cases A and R) required no extra spare capacity at all, while one (Test Case L) required an increase of over 13%. It's therefore clear which of these 18 co-incident SRLGs on an individual basis have the most deleterious effect on spare capacity (L, Q, D, and G, each costing more than 5% in extra capacity).
But more importantly, we can observe that by removing the few most costly individual SRLGs, we can quite significantly reduce the network-wide spare capacity. In the test cases above, removing just the top four SRLGs present reduces the SRLG-related cost penalty by more than 50%, as can be seen in the lower 4 rows of Table 1 . Here we've created four new test cases by removing the most costly SRLG, then the next most costly, and so on and determined how much the capacity cost penalty is reduced. We see that the normalized cost drops from nearly 46% to slightly more than 20%, shaving almost 26% from the network's cost of spare capacity (or reducing that extra cost by 55.5%). Even if a network operator can only afford to eliminate a single SRLG, doing so here would improve the normalized cost by nearly 22%.
Effects of Nodal Working Capacity Disparity
Looking back to Figs 10 and 12, we can see from the wide scatter about the mean trend lines, that nodal degree and location must not be the only factors affecting the severity of a co-incident span SRLG. There are, for example, some co-incident SRLGs incident upon degree-4 nodes at the edge of the network that are more costly to protect against than those incident upon degree-3 nodes at the network interior. Upon careful inspection of the 18 individual co-incident SRLG test cases in Section 7, we can identify at least one more factor that diagnoses or predicts the design impact of a span SRLG. This is the working capacity disparity of the SRLG spans which we define as the total difference in working capacity on spans contained in a co-incident SRLG and those at the same node that are not involved in the SRLG. When we compare each SRLG's working capacity disparity with the additional spare capacity required to make that SRLG restorable, it shows itself as a fairly effective additional predictor of span SRLG impact. This is seen in Fig. 13 which represents each of the same 18 individual span SRLGs from the ranking study above, portrayed in a scatter plot of the disparity condition at their individual nodes plotted against their individual spare capacity penalty as found above. It shows clearly that as the working capacity disparity increases, so too does the cost of additional spare capacity required to protect that SRLG. This can be explained with reasoning similar to that which leads to a nodal lower bound on spare capacity under basic SCA conditions, discussed in [8] and elsewhere. For failure of any given span incident on a node, all surviving spans also incident on the node require at least as much total spare capacity as there is working capacity on the failed span. It can be shown that if any one span incident upon a given node has a much higher amount of working capacity than the others, then a greater amount of spare capacity will be required relative to the total working capacity in the network. In other words SR networks with evenly balanced working capacity at each node are more efficient because the sharing of spare capacity can approach the 1/(d)1) lower bound on redundancy (where d is the network average nodal degree) [8] . Similarly, for a co-incident SRLG, we can treat the dual-span failure scenario as we would an individual span failure when considering the network's working capacity balance and interaction with the nodal lower bounds on spare capacity. If the spans making up the SRLG contain a vastly greater amount of working capacity than the surviving spans at the same node, then those surviving spans must take a proportionally larger amount of the spare capacity load, and subsequently unbalancing the working capacity over the failure scenarios to consider in the capacity design.
Concluding Discussion
We have presented a method to design a spanrestorable mesh transport network that contains known dual-span SRLGs, and used that capability to study the influence and severity of such span SRLGs in different network contexts, such as the degree of the node they are incident to and their overall location in the network. Data shows that even one SRLG in a network can require a network-wide increase in spare capacity as high as 18%. The worst case will tend to be where the span SRLG is co-incident on a degree-3 node, near the network core, and with a high difference between working capacity on the spans in the SRLG relative to other spans at the same node. Such a worstcase span SRLG would be a prime candidate for physical-layer re-arrangements to eliminate it, the payback in network capacity being considerable. With the methods given, each individual span SRLG that is known in a network can be ranked for its capacity penalty. The findings also indicated that many other SRLGs, for instance those that are incident on degree-4 (or higher) nodes located at or near the edge of the network, are easily tolerated. But a case-by-case study using the methods here is always warranted to make the detailed assessments. Having co-incident SRLGs at many nodes can obviously have a more serious effect on network capacity efficiency. In our tests of SRLGs at four nodes in the 40n70s1 network, we required an average of 14.6% extra in network spare capacity, and in one random test case (when all four were incident on degree-4 nodes near the network core), spare capacity costs were increased by 46.8% to retain 100% restorability. This is interesting to consider in light of the fact that almost 80% of all dual failures are automatically restorable just as a side effect of designing for single span failures only. And yet these four specific SRLGs require almost 50% extra spare capacity. The observation that designing for 100% of the relatively far fewer co-incident span SRLGs yields almost 100% restorability against the many more dual-failure scenarios in general, suggests a point for further research. That is to view the SRLG-SCA solution with all span SRLGs present as a first-stage heuristic in a process to design for entire dual-failure restorability. The SRLG-SCA design model introduced here could also be used to assess the spare capacity costs as part of a process of selective elimination of known SRLGs (or to prioritize elimination of known SRLGs). On the other hand, if there is no specific knowledge of the actual SRLGs that might be present, but a concern that they could arise almost anywhere, then the results of the paper suggest design strategies to contend with them. The best strategy would be (subject to some budget limitations) to design to cover as many co-incident SRLGs at degree-3 sites as possible, as this produces the greatest coverage in general of other SRLGs and dual-failure scenarios. Conversely, measures to eliminate a co-incident SRLG incident at a degree-3 node near the network's core would generally be most likely to recover the maximum capacity efficiency improvements. If it is not known where SRLGs exist in a network, an operator could also concentrate his search on those potential SRLGs with a large working capacity disparity, as they too would tend to provide the greatest benefit to eliminate.
A final point to emphasize is that while this study has considered co-incident dual-span SRLG effects on span-restorable networks, they will have a similar general effect on other restoration schemes as well; they simply remain to be similarly quantified. Span-restorable networks build consideration of any span SRLGs into their restoration routes, whereas SBPP would need to consult an SRLG database (and current primary-backup sharability database) in determining the eligible backup routes for each new primary path. A span SRLG will thus have its corresponding effect upon SBPP by reducing failure disjointness options between primary paths and by forcing the adoption of less efficient backup path routes and limiting otherwise higher sharing opportunities. There is no survivable networking scheme in general that will not suffer some capacity penalty in the presence of span SRLGs because they are fundamentally a form of dual failure in the logical transport graph topology. Conversely, there is no scheme for which a hidden or unknown span SRLG may not result in some loss of protection or restoration ratio, relative to the design intent if the spare capacity was planned for a set of failure scenarios that excluded the given SRLG. These are not effects that are somehow specific to span-restorable networks alone, but rather are common to all restoration and protection mechanisms.
